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Reform in Lieu of Change:
Tastes Great, Less Filling

Jonathan GS Koppell is an associate
professor of politics and management at
the Yale School of Management. He has
written on the dynamics of quasigovernment and is currently writing a book
about the organization and administration
of transnational governance organizations.
E-mail: jonathan.koppell@yale.edu.

In this response to Light, Koppell argues that the increasing frequency of reform may reﬂect Congress’s inability to
make signiﬁcant changes to the substance of entrenched
government programs. Moreover, he observes that the
more profound evolution in government has been the
movement toward market-based provision of services,
which has created demand for new competencies in the
public sector.

I

n writing about the nature of bureaucratic reform,
Paul Light may have chosen his metaphor too
skillfully. His “tides of reform” perfectly capture
the phenomenon he has meticulously documented.
He makes it seem natural, inevitable, and perhaps a
bit too unremarkable.
Light’s model demonstrates the relentless, if aimless,
march of reform. In the mode of a geologist, Light
looks at the thickness of sedimentary layers of legislation to determine what was going on during key
historical periods. In recent decades, for example, we
have seen a dramatic increase in the rate of accretion
for reform measures. The explanation (probably) lies
not in a volcanic eruption or meteor impact but in
something else, some greater change in the American
political system.
Although Light explores the rise of “liberation” reform
at seemingly dissimilar moments in American history
and the correlation of “watchful eye” reform with
public distrust, the meaning of all these waves remains
unclear. Putting aside the question of whether all this
reform works—that is, whether it makes government
better at achieving its objectives—what does the reform frenzy tell us about the state of polity? Or perhaps less grandiosely, can the phenomenon that Light
captures be viewed as an indicator of something more
profound?
The ﬁrst possibility is that reform—or more accurately, reform legislation—has emerged as a substitute
for actual change, which is eﬀectively impossible in
the current political environment. Jonathan Rauch
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(1994) has characterized the American political system
as suﬀering from “demosclerosis,” that is, incapable of
moving as a consequence of powerful interest groups
and electoral incentives of legislators and bureaucracies
intent on protecting budgets and full-time equivalent
employees.
Clearly, it is hyperbole to say that nothing happens.
The last decade or so has seen signiﬁcant alterations in
federal welfare and education policy.
But programs are rarely eliminated or consolidated,
even when doing so would make a great deal of sense.
New programs are often dead on arrival because budget constraints mandate the elimination of some
existing item to pay for them. “Issue networks” may
have metaphorically supplanted “iron triangles,” but
they are no less formidable as a source of systemic
inertia (Heclo 1978). Constituencies are mobilized,
subcommittee chairmen ﬁercely protect their hardwon terrain, and agency oﬃcials tenaciously sink their
claws into budget authority that will never be seen
again once it is retracted.
Only by pulling the process out of the political meat
grinder through extralegislative mechanisms such as
the Base Realignment and Closure Commission does
it seem these combined forces can be overcome. It
matters not whether eﬀorts to pare back this or that
agency are motivated by narrow political interest or
high-minded concern for the eﬀective functioning of
government. The overwhelming majority of such
eﬀorts have failed. It is simply too hard to really
change anything.
Thus, the reform measures that Light counts are feeble
yet feasible substitutes for renovation. Their popularity
is a sign that many members of Congress and others
in the federal policy-making universe have essentially
given up on change. Reform is “change lite”—less
satisfying but attainable. Still, it feeds the illusion
(delusion?) that Congress is actively engaged in the
business of public administration. Of course, Congress

engages in the yearly budget and appropriations process, the most formidable tool at its disposal for oversight of the vast federal bureaucracy. But it has
its limitations. The change in the year-to-year budget
is rather limited, particularly the discretionary portion
of the budget, which is ostensibly where Congress can
exercise the most inﬂuence. Previous budget decisions
as well as the agenda-setting power of the White
House and permanent bureaucracy further circumscribe congressional authority (Kettl 1989). The budget is a blunt tool, and it, too, has been
dulled by the ceaseless grinding away of interest
group politics.
Management reform may be the most accessible
means available to legislators who are unhappy with
the status quo. It may be easier to attempt to alter the
substance of a federal program through general reform
than by direct attack. The across-the-board introduction of cost–beneﬁt analysis for new regulations illustrates this idea. Widely acknowledged as having the
intent of curtailing many agencies’ regulatory eﬀorts,
its passage may have been more likely than any bill
aimed at shutting down or retrenching an individual
regulatory agency.1
Light acknowledges Terry Moe’s powerful observation
that many government agencies are “designed to fail.”
Losers of legislative battles are often able to sow the
seeds of bureaucratic failure in the design of government agencies created against their wishes. Moreover,
the winners may saddle agencies with burdensome
designs to prevent future generations from undermining their victory. What Light does not consider is
that these observations apply equally to reform eﬀorts!
In assuming that all reform is intended to make
government work better, Light shows natural “good
government” instincts when a little more cynicism is
probably in order. Surely, the features of a reform bill
are as likely to include subversive elements as legislation creating a new entity.
Therefore, the problem of measuring whether any
reform has “worked” is even more vexing than Light
suggests. The reform may never have been expected to
work in the ﬁrst place—if by “work,” we mean, “make
the government agency function more eﬀectively.”
The reformer may have judged success by the increased inertness of the bureaucracy.
Are we to conclude, then, that government remains
static, ever unchanging? Of course not. But it isn’t
clear that the study of legislative reform captures the
most interesting metamorphosis. It is, of course, terribly unfair to criticize a comprehensive study on one
topic for failing to cover everything else. Nevertheless,
one limitation of Light’s study of reform during the
last 60-odd years is that it artiﬁcially circumscribes the
world. If we consider a much broader conception of

reform, one that includes gradual shifts in the approach to public policy embodied in the whole panoply of government programs, then the examination of
reform legislation provides only a partial glimpse. It is
as if we were commenting on the state of the world’s
oceans based on tidal observations from a perch on a
single beach.
The irregular movements from one reform philosophy
to another do not fully capture slower shifts in the
general conception of government’s role in society.
Nor can we truly appreciate how the expectations for
government intervention in the economy or society
have changed over the years by interpreting the data
Light has compiled.
Although there has been little consistency within the
reform universe, a general trend is observable from a
few steps further back. In the last three decades, the
government’s delivery of public goods has increasingly
come to depend on markets and private-sector organizations. This is true in ways that are both prosaic and
profound.
The contracting of public services is nothing new. But
as public administration scholars and professionals
have noted (with Light leading the way), the reliance
on contractors has accelerated in the last 25 years at
every level of government, and it has been motivated
by two factors. One is ideological: the belief that
private-sector organizations are inherently more efﬁcient and eﬀective than government agencies. The
second is political: the desire to reduce the apparent
size of government by shifting employment from
federal bureaucracies to the contractors who work for
them (usually at greater net expense). The eﬀect has
been especially profound in some agencies. The U.S.
Agency for International Development, for example,
has evolved into a manager of contracts, relying on a
host of “beltway bandits” to implement most of its
programs (Oﬃce of the Vice President 1993). Over
the long term, such evolution has literally changed the
shape of government, with government bureaucracies
rendered top heavy as actual service providers are
increasingly employed by private ﬁrms (Light 1999).
More signiﬁcant is the use of market-based mechanisms in place of traditional administrative tools. The
cutting edge of this trend is in the regulatory arena.
Command-and-control-style regulation, after years of
being pilloried, is being pushed aside by novel approaches (Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins 1998). In the
area of emissions regulation, for example, permit
trading places the reduction decisions in the hands of
ﬁrms. This logic has been extended to land use, in
which grazing permits and mineral-extraction rights
have been auctioned (so far on a pilot basis). This
approach uses the market to determine the “value” of
the privilege to consume a public good and even shifts
Reform in Lieu of Change
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political activism to the marketplace by giving environmentalists an opportunity to purchase land-use
privileges or pollution permits.2
Other uses of the marketplace are already institutionalized and viewed as models to be extended to new
areas. Government insurance and loan-guarantee
programs are vital public policy tools in a wide range
of policy areas, including agriculture, housing, trade,
international development, energy, small business, and
so on. Such programs attempt to eﬀect change not by
direct expenditure but by altering the incentives of
private-market participants. This has the major beneﬁt
of reducing outlays while increasing risk. Government’s capability is pared with this approach, limited
to the extent that it can shape the incentives of proﬁtdriven actors.
Pushed by changes in budget rules, ﬁscal constraints,
and a belief that market instruments are more eﬀectively wielded by institutions that are designed to
function in the marketplace, the last few decades have
seen increasing reliance on public-sector institutions
that look more like private-sector organizations. Experimental during the First World War, the permanent population of government corporations boomed
during and following World War II. Interestingly,
government corporations have become, in many respects, indistinguishable from government agencies.
They are on budget, receive appropriated dollars, and
are staﬀed by presidential appointees and civil servants. Indeed, the deﬁnition of a government corporation is so ambiguous that a Government
Accountability Oﬃce study of such organizations
relied on entities to determine whether they were, in
fact, government corporations (GAO 1995).
What makes a “true” government corporation diﬀerent from an agency is its generation of revenue, which
typically covers its costs. This represents a departure
from the traditional agency model because it introduces return as a constraint rather than the traditional, legislatively determined budget. Admittedly,
for most government corporations, this is not a hard
constraint because their budgets are not literally constrained by revenues, but its eﬀect is real. Managers of
government corporations must shape activities with
the goal of breaking even (Koppell 2003).
Strange mutations of the basic government corporation have spread across the governmental landscape.
Most are surprised to learn of the federal government’s
extensive lineup of venture capital funds, for example.
Both the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and
the U.S. Agency for International Development oversee a portfolio of government venture capital funds.3
Most intriguing is the Central Intelligence Agency’s
In-Q-Tel, a technology fund named after the gadget
wizard, Q, of the James Bond ﬁlms.
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Two other public–private “hybrids” have funny names
as well, but their ﬁnancial heft and centrality in the
U.S. housing market make Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac serious business. The two companies are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs); both are publicly
traded on the New York Stock Exchange and endowed
with special privileges by their creator, Congress.
Fannie and Freddie must not only break even, they
owe a proﬁtable return to their shareholders while
meeting regulatory demands for ﬁscal safety and attainment of public policy goals. Congress is currently
considering legislation that would revamp the regulatory infrastructure for the housing GSEs in the face of
revelations of ﬁnancial mismanagement and perennial
concerns that the two companies are not doing
enough to justify their eﬀective federal subsidy.
These developments represent the new face of government. It is the embodiment of reform that is not tidal
but tectonic, slowly altering the contours of the public
sector. Interestingly, the emergence of governance in
its new form is making it clearer than ever that true
reform is necessary if the state is to remain eﬀective in
its new guise. In this respect, there are three priorities.
First, our understanding of regulation must catch up
with reality. Government will be under increasing
pressure to develop more market-based alternatives to
traditional regulation, and traditional approaches
must be adapted to meet new demands. Hybrid organizations have less formal links to the federal bureaucracy than traditional agencies; they are not on
budget, they are not staﬀed by appointees, and they
are exempt from management laws. Generally, they
are “controlled” through regulatory relationships
rather than by administration. To make hybrids work
as instruments of public policy, government will have
to get better at using regulation as a substitute for
administration.
Second, the reliance on contractors is placing a premium on contract management as a government skill.
In the coming years, the skillfulness with which this
function is executed—designing tasks, soliciting bids,
monitoring and measuring performance—will be the
crucial determinant of government eﬀectiveness.
Finally, use of market-based mechanisms such as loan
guarantees and insurance represents an intelligent
leveraging of the U.S. government’s creditworthiness. It
creates public goods without adding to public debt, but
it also poses incredible risk to the public. At present,
however, the federal government has not demonstrated
the ability to be a sound risk manager. This is perhaps
the greatest reform needed in government today. With
trillions of dollars in outstanding liability, the federal
government is sitting on a ﬁnancial powder keg that
could explode under trying circumstances. If Congress
is serious about getting back into management, it needs

to pass up the next opportunity for “paperwork reduction” or “performance and results” and do something
about risk management.
Would that be liberation, scientiﬁc management,
watchful eye, or war on waste?
Notes
1. In fact, the Risk Assessment and Cost-Beneﬁt Act
of 1995 and several successors failed to get congressional approval, although some aspects of this and
similar bills have been implemented by executive
order (Anderson, Chirba-Martin, Elliott, et al.
1989).
2. This strategy is under attack from those who argue
that environmentalists should not be allowed to
purchase grazing rights with the intention of letting
them remain ungrazed. In the American tradition,
litigation has commenced (Heilprin 2005).
3. Each set of funds has very diﬀerent structure.
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